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If the Democrats win the Presidential elections in the US and the majority in both
houses, the possibility will emerge to address a question which is particularly close
to the constitutionalist’s heart: what to do about the Supreme Court?
The Court has been the object of a right-wing takeover project for more than three
decades, and unless something unforeseen happens, this project will finally be
accomplished under the presidency of Donald Trump. If he and the Republicans in
the Senate manage to fill the post of the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in time,
six of the nine seats on the bench will be filled with what we have gotten used to
call “conservatives”. The spurious hope that Chief Justice John Roberts might turn
himself into a swing vote between the conservative and liberal parts of the bench
in the mold of Anthony Kennedy, will completely evaporate. The Court will be firmly
embedded in a large-scale right-wing project to immunize the dominance of white
rich men for the foreseeable future against the culturally and demographically ever
more inevitable defeat at the ballot box.
In the event of an election victory in November, would the Democrats simply
have to accept that state of affairs? The discussion about packing the Court to
reverse the majority shift has been going on for some time, but has now gained
considerable momentum. At first glance, this idea bears a frightening likeness to
what authoritarian regimes like to do to their independent judiciary: moving the
needle of the majority balance on the court by filling the bench with new people
of their own choosing. The sitting judges cannot be fired, but their number can
be increased to an extent necessary to open enough new posts to be filled with
obedient loyalists to make any possible resistance from the court futile. It is the
power of the legislature to do this (by the way, in Germany, too). This is what
Erdo#an did, this is what Orbán did, this is what Kaczy#ski did. Now also Biden?
On the other hand, it is by no means always and in every case a bad thing and
hurtful to democracy and the rule of law when the political majority decides to take
on the judiciary. Few will dispute the fact that the constitutional courts of, say,
Venezuela or Poland in their current composure must not exist a minute longer than
the power reality in these countries compels. When a court is compromised and
corrupted to a point that it can no longer claim any respect for its judgments except
from those who benefit from them in the first place, then it is, in the interest of the
rule of law, not just forgivable for the political majority to set about repairing this state
of affairs, but downright necessary.
What corrupts these courts is not the political effects and motives of their judgments.
The problem is not that they are veering too much to the right (or left). The problem
isn’t even necessarily the personal integrity of the judges. The problem is that a court
that allows itself to be turned into a tool of a particular political party won’t properly
function as a court for much longer. It can hardly expect plaintiffs and defendants
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to accept its verdict even if they are defeated. It becomes a hollow, embarrassing,
painted papier-mâché caricature of itself, despised by all and not least of all by its
own political masters.
It is no secret that the U.S. Supreme Court has handed down many rulings
implementing right-wing policies, poking holes into the right to abortion, striking down
gun regulations. Which I find very regrettable, of course, but in itself a rather weak
argument for liberal court packing. But there is another set of judgments to complete
the picture, which are not so much about politically contested issues, but about the
democratic playing field itself. This very playing field has been tilted in the favor of
the Republicans by the Republican-nominated majority in the Supreme Court time
and again, when it came to campaign financing, when it came to gerrymandering,
when it came to voter restriction, when it came to whether or not George W. Bush
actually had won the election. Again and again. For years.
Conversely, the Supreme Court itself, like the federal courts in general, has in recent
years become the target of right-wing takeover policies to an extent that cannot
be left unchallenged – starting with the blocking of every judicial nomination of
President Obama, regardless of person and policy, which unfortunately provoked the
Democrats in 2013 to lower the quorum necessary for the election of federal judges
in the Senate to 50%. Then, of course, the refusal of the Republican Senate majority
in 2016 to grant Obama’s candidate Merrick Garland even a hearing, thus stealing
from Obama the right to choose a nominee and handing it to Trump instead. Finally,
the abolition of the Senate minority’s voice in the election of Supreme Court judges
on the occasion of the election of Neil Gorsuch in 2017. If we add the Republicans’
judicial policy at the state level, we get the full picture: In Arizona and Georgia,
Republicans have indeed successfully packed the State Supreme Courts to turn the
majority balance in their favor, and in several further states they have tried.
There is no equivalent on the Democrat side to this. This is not the usual political
game in which one side tries to win against the other and vice versa. Here, one side
tries to manipulate the rules of the game in its own favor and at the expense of the
other, and only one side, for many years, openly and bluntly, while the other side
looked on helplessly and with ever increasing panic as the constitutional fabric of the
democratic state under the rule of law was torn to shreds one judicial nomination at a
time.
With their acknowledgement that they will elect RBG’s successor weeks before the
election when they had refused Garland a hearing months before the election, the
Senate Republicans have renounced any pretense of what their true aim is: turning
the Supreme Court into their tool. The ultimate proof that they have achieved that
aim would be delivered by the Court if it stops the counting of postal-vote ballots
in November or December and thus hands victory to Trump even while everyone
knows that he has in all likelihood lost. An outcome which would, of course, also put
an end to all dreams of liberal court packing for a long time to come.
If, on the other hand, the Democrats win in November, it will probably take a
landslide – one that will bury the entire Republican establishment ten feet deep.
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Then a new situation will arise. Many things that seem unimaginable today will then
become conceivable.
This week on Verfassungsblog
… together with the German Bar Association we have launched a new podcast
entitled We need to talk about the Rule of Law, which we discuss in a total of
12 episodes different aspects of the rule of law crisis in Europe every Wednesday
with European guests from various countries. In the first episode, the focus
was on Constitutional Courts. They are under fire in many countries, not only
in Poland, but also e.g. in Spain, which is why I was particularly thrilled to be
able to discuss this with two former (vice-)presidents of Constitutional Courts,
namely STANISLAW BIERNAT and PEDRO CRUZ VILLALÓN. My third guest was
MICHAELA HAILBRONNER, expert on the German Constitutional Court and well
known to all Verfassungsblog readers. Unfortunately we had some sound issues, but
the content is very much worth listening to.
The EU Commission has published its asylum package, which is supposed to fix
the weaknesses of the Dublin system – but doesn’t, really. DANIEL THYM examines
the central contents of the reform package and comes to the conclusion that, for all
the solemn words, it leaves much to be desired. Meanwhile, the British government
has chosen to adopt the “Australian solution” of preventing boats with fugitives
from reaching England’s shores through a mixture of “pushback” and “pullback”
strategies. This is hardly compatible with international refugee, human and maritime
law, as EMILIE McDONELL demonstrates.
Waldemar #urek and Monika Fr#ckowiak are the names of two Polish judges whom
I don’t hesitate to call heroes, for all the distress they have been suffering at the
hand of the PiS government and their disciplinary henchmen. This week, their cases
were heard before the ECJ. JOHN MORIJN was on site and reports on the lessons
he learned from listening to the Polish government representative.
The Sharpston affair at the ECJ has caused the most heated discussions on
Verfassungsblog for a long time, and now CARL BAUDENBACHER, the former
president of the EFTA Court, has intervened: Unlike many other authors, however,
he asks not whether the suspension of the term of office of the Advocate General
was generally lawful, but whether her exclusion from the European Court of Justice
is compatible with EU law, with a view to a case of the EFTA Court from 2016.
A vaccine against Covid-19 does not yet exist, but once it does it will trigger difficult
distribution issues. ANIKA KLAFKI gives a legal overview of the questions that the
government should ask itself before deciding on prioritizing access to the vaccine.
How can legal protection against unlawful police operations be effectively
provided? Administrative court injunctions usually come too late and the processing
of illegal police operations before criminal courts does not function structurally.
DAVID WERDERMANN comments on a recent ruling by the Regional Court of
Cologne.
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In Indonesia the government is turning the popular Anti-Corruption Commission into
a toothless tiger, as MULKI SHADER and ABDURRACHMAN SATRIO criticize.
That’s it for this week again. All the best and take care, and please don’t forget to
support us via Steady or send us (paypal@verfassungsblog.de) the sum you deem
appropriate for our work this week. Many thanks!
Max Steinbeis
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